Wasting Away: America\u27s Dysfunctional System of Low-Level radioactive Disposal by Berman, Jacob
Seattle Journal of Environmental Law 
Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 10 
5-31-2013 
Wasting Away: America's Dysfunctional System of Low-Level 
radioactive Disposal 
Jacob Berman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjel 
Recommended Citation 
Berman, Jacob (2013) "Wasting Away: America's Dysfunctional System of Low-Level radioactive 
Disposal," Seattle Journal of Environmental Law: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjel/vol3/iss1/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal of Environmental 




Wasting Away: America’s Dysfunctional System of 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 
Jacob Berman† 
This paper argues that the current system for disposing of civilian1 
low-level radioactive waste in the United States is broken, and that 
large-scale reform is necessary to adequately handle the volume of 
waste expected from further nuclear decommissioning. Between 
1947 and 1980, the federal government had sole responsibility for 
low-level radioactive waste disposal. The Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act of 1980 upended this system, devolving responsi-
bility for civilian low-level radioactive waste disposal to the states. 
Devolution has been a disaster.  
For the last thirty years, state governments have been beset by Not 
In My Back Yard syndrome, as project after project designed to 
handle additional low-level radioactive waste has been halted by 
local opposition, leaving the system vulnerable to meddling by state 
regulators eager to exclude out-of-state waste. This paper discusses 
the history of this country’s system to manage low-level radioactive 
waste, how it gradually became dysfunctional, and what reforms 
are necessary to fix it. This paper proposes a two-part solution: 
first, the integration of Energy Department low-level waste disposal 
sites into the commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal sys-
tem, and second, by junking the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Poli-
cy Act and returning to the centralized governance structure utilized 
prior to 1980. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction ....................................................................................... 272 
II. A History of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal in the United 
States ..................................................................................................... 276 
                                                 
† Deputy Attorney General, California Department of Justice. The author would like to thank 
Professor Richard B. Stewart of N.Y.U. Law School, under whose guidance this research was 
performed, as well as Scott Blair, Alice Byowitz, and Basilio Valdehuesa. The opinions expressed in 
this paper are the author’s, and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the California Department 
of Justice. 
1. In this paper, I use “civilian waste” and “commercial waste” interchangeably. 
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“They say atomic radiation can hurt your reproductive organs. My an-
swer is, so can a hockey stick.” 
-Johnny Carson 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Radioactive waste is pretty bad for you. But not all radioactive 
waste is as bad as Hollywood would have you believe. While some types 
of nuclear waste remain dangerous for millennia, the most common type 
of radioactive waste, low-level waste, is neither particularly long-lived, 
nor particularly dangerous. Low-level radioactive waste is a catchall 
category composed of all nuclear waste that is not spent nuclear fuel, 
high-level waste, transuranic waste, or uranium mill tailings.2 In practice, 
this means that the vast majority of low-level waste is made up of 
common objects, like protective gear, medical supplies, and other 
equipment that has been exposed to neutron radiation, or has otherwise 
become contaminated with radioisotopes.3 Low-level waste comes from 
a variety of sources, including universities, hospitals, nuclear power 
                                                 
2. 10 C.F.R. § 62.2 (2013).State-level definitions generally track the NRC definition. See, e.g., 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7061(a)(5) (2013); 420 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/3 (2013). 
3. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, RADIOACTIVE WASTE: PRODUCTION, STORAGE, 
DISPOSAL 17 (2002). 
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plants, and industry. Low-level waste is by far the most common form of 
radioactive waste.4 
 The radioisotopes involved in low-level waste have relatively short 
half-lives compared to most other forms of nuclear waste, such that after 
twenty-five years of storage, only 25 percent of the original radioactivity 
remains.5 By comparison, other forms of waste require storage for 
centuries, or even millennia.6 The relatively low levels of radioactivity 
mean that the standard method of disposing of this low-level radioactive 
waste is to bury the waste in lined, engineered trenches below-grade, 
which are eventually covered and capped once full.7 There are four 
classes of low-level radioactive waste. In order of increasing 
radioactivity, these are class A, B, C, and greater-than-class C.8 Class A 
waste is the least hazardous to human health, and makes up over 95 
percent of low-level waste volumes; Class B and C waste makes up the 
other 5 percent, but contains 90 percent of all low-level radioactivity. 
Greater-than-class C waste is technically “low-level waste,” but its 
radioactivity levels are so high that it is regulated outside the commercial 
waste system. As such, greater-than-class C waste is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
 Before 1980, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and 
its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), were 
responsible for disposal of nuclear waste, subject to the Agreement State 
process, which permitted individual states to assume day-to-day 
regulatory responsibility.9 In 1980, Congress passed the Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRWPA) to completely revamp the 
disposal of civilian low-level radioactive waste and to devolve 
responsibility for low-level waste disposal to the states. This came after a 
series of highly-publicized containment failures permanently shuttered 
half the nation’s low-level waste disposal facilities, and after a near-
revolt by the three states that hosted the remaining disposal sites.10 The 
LLRWPA was modeled on a proposal developed by the National 
                                                 
4. EDWARD L. GERSHEY, ROBERT C. KLEIN, ESMERALDA PARTY & AMY WILKERSON, LOW-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE: FROM CRADLE TO GRAVE 12 (1990). 
5. S.C. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & ENVTL. CONTROL, COMMERCIAL LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE 
WASTE DISPOSAL IN SOUTH CAROLINA 6 (2007). 
6. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 8. 
7. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N ADVISORY COMM. ON NUCLEAR WASTE, NUREG-1853, 
HISTORY AND FRAMEWORK OF COMMERCIAL LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 33 (2007). 
8. These standards are defined more specifically at 10 C.F.R. § 61. 
9. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N ADVISORY COMM. ON NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 7, at 
1. As of this writing, NRC’s website currently lists 37 Agreement States. 
10. Jane Chuang, Who Should Win the Garbage Wars? Lessons from the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2403, 2407 (2004). 
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Governors Association.11 Under the LLRWPA, the federal government 
retained responsibility for disposal of low-level radioactive waste 
associated with the Department of Energy, Navy vessel 
decommissioning, the nuclear weapons program, and Greater-than-Class-
C low-level waste.12 
 The key component of the LLRWPA was a provision permitting 
states to arrange themselves into “interstate compacts,” which are 
voluntary associations of state governments that would regulate low-
level waste disposal within the compact and permit the exclusion of 
radioactive waste from outside the compact.13 At the time, it was 
believed that these voluntary associations would provide sufficient 
encouragement for state governments to band together and construct new 
disposal capacity, with a deadline of January 1, 1986.14 This did not 
happen. 
 As it occurred, the majority of states ended up joining compacts, but 
by 1983 it was clear that no new disposal capacity would be constructed 
by the Congressionally-mandated deadline, if at all.15 As such, the 
LLRWPA was amended in 1985, resetting the statutory deadline, but 
also putting teeth in the legislation; any state that failed to provide for 
disposal capacity by January 1, 1993, would be required, among other 
things,16 to take title to any low-level waste generated within its borders 
and “be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by [the 
generator or owner of the waste] as a consequence of the failure of the 
State to take possession.”17 
 This “take-title” provision, which was passed into law and signed 
by President Reagan, led to two results. First, the states began to develop 
their disposal sites in earnest, but only one site actually opened—and that 
site was developed commercially, from outside the compact system.18 
Second, a flurry of litigation entered the courts, spearheaded by the 
                                                 
11. RICHARD B. STEWART & JANE B. STEWART, FUEL CYCLE TO NOWHERE: U.S. LAW & 
POLICY ON NUCLEAR WASTE 259 (2011). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(b)(1) (2013). 
13. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N ADVISORY COMM. ON NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 7, 
at 16. 
14. Id. at 16 n.22. 
15. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGIONAL LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL 
SITES—PROGRESS BEING MADE BUT NEW SITES WILL PROBABLY NOT BE READY BY 1986 15 
(1983). 
16. The other incentives provided for by the 1985 Amendments were monetary. See Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (2012). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (2013). 
18. This is the Class A waste facility at Clive, Utah, which exists more-or-less outside the 
compact system. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N ADVISORY COMM. ON NUCLEAR WASTE, supra 
note 7, at 23. 
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communities identified to host the disposal sites. Specifically, the State 
of New York, which had not joined a compact, and the two rural New 
York counties that were identified to host the New York disposal site, 
sought to hold unconstitutional the take-title provision and the monetary 
penalties provided for by the 1985 Amendments.19 The case, New York v. 
United States, reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1992. The Court used 
this historic opportunity to create landmark Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence and completely defang the LLRWPA.20  
 With the take-title provision gone, the states soon lost any interest 
in providing for their own disposal facilities. Civilian low-level waste 
disposal languished in limbo for twenty years, as only three facilities 
remained open between 1992 and 2012—two from the AEC era 
(Richland, Washington and Barnwell, South Carolina), and the new 
Clive, Utah, facility, which was constructed outside the compact system 
and licensed in 1991.21 (Beatty, located near the Nevada Test Site, had 
been closed by executive order of the Governor of Nevada in the 
meantime.) Because of the uncertainty surrounding their future 
availability, these facilities proved to be barely adequate to handle the 
nation’s low-level waste. Richland closed to out-of-compact waste as 
soon as possible. Barnwell, for years the only place that most states could 
legally dispose of Class B and C waste, was in constant danger of being 
closed to out-of-compact waste. Barnwell later closed to out-of-compact 
waste between 1994 and 1995,22 and closed to out-of-compact waste 
permanently in 2008.23 Clive was only licensed to handle Class A 
waste—and an attempt to permit Class B and C waste at Clive was 
rejected by the Utah Legislature.24 Clive is actually required to accept 
wastes from all sources, under the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, which held that states are forbidden from 
excluding waste based on its source, barring an explicit grant of 
Congressional authority like the LLRWPA.25 One new regional disposal 
facility, located at Andrews, Texas, opened in 2012, but that regional 
                                                 
19. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992). 
20. Id. at 176-77. 
21. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N ADVISORY COMM. ON NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 7, 
at 23. It is uncertain just how much authority the Northwest Compact has over the Clive facility at 
present; litigation is ongoing on the subject as Energysolutions, the operator of Clive, seeks to 
import waste from other sources. See Energysolutions v. Utah, 625 F. 3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2010). 
22. S.C. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & ENVTL. CONTROL, supra 5, at 1. 
23. N.C. RADIATION PROT. COMM’N, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT IN 
NORTH CAROLINA 5 (2008). 
24. UTAH OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR GEN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF RADIATION CONTROL 6 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-3-103.7 (West 2013). 
25. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see also Energysolutions, 625 
F.3d 1261 (confirming that the Clive facility existed outside the compact system). 
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disposal facility required two decades of consistent effort and a 
gerrymandered compact to construct.26 
 The failure of the compact system to produce a workable low-level 
waste disposal regime is evident from the numbers: in 1980, six 
geographically contiguous regional compacts, covering all fifty states, 
were envisioned, each with its own regional disposal facility for low-
level waste, incorporating the three old AEC-era disposal facilities into 
the system.27 As of this writing, there are currently ten compacts 
covering forty states. Only three of these compacts currently have a 
designated regional disposal facility. In short, the nation’s low-level 
radioactive waste disposal system looks nothing like what was 
envisioned in 1980, and is ridden with dysfunction and infighting. 
II. A HISTORY OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. The AEC Era 
 In 1947, with the Atomic Age only two years old, Congress 
established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to assume control of 
the nation’s nuclear waste. Disposal of low-level nuclear waste was a 
problem from the beginning. In the 1950s, the AEC initially dealt with 
low-level waste by putting it into cement weighted 55-gallon steel 
drums, then dumping those drums into the ocean.28 This was never 
intended to be a permanent solution; the high cost of marine low-level 
waste disposal, combined with environmental concerns, led the AEC to 
devise a regime to license commercial disposal facilities on land.29 
 Six facilities were built in the 1960s, distributed relatively evenly 
about the country, and usually sited in close proximity to existing nuclear 
facilities. These six facilities were located at Beatty, Nevada; Maxey 
Flats, Kentucky; West Valley, New York; Richland, Washington; 
Barnwell, South Carolina; and Sheffield, Illinois.30 Beatty, Maxey Flats, 
West Valley, and Barnwell were licensed by state authorities under the 
Agreement State program; Richland and Sheffield were licensed by the 
                                                 
26. STEWART & STEWART, supra note 11, at 259. 
27. TASK FORCE ON LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL, NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, 
LOW-LEVEL WASTE: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION 10–11 (1980). 
28. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N ADVISORY COMM. ON NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 7, 
at 7. 
29. Id. As land disposal facilities gradually became available, marine disposal gradually 
tapered off and was brought to a complete halt by 1970. 
30. Id. at 10. Beatty is located near the Nevada Test Site, West Valley is located on the grounds 
of the later-aborted nuclear reprocessing site of the same name, Richland is on the grounds of the 
Hanford Reservation, and Barnwell is adjacent to the Savannah River Site. 
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AEC directly.31 The distinction between AEC regulation and Agreement 
State regulation is largely academic.  
 Under the Agreement State program, the AEC could delegate the 
power to regulate nuclear activities to state agencies if certain regulatory 
milestones were met, similar to the delegation framework later used for 
the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. At the time, no standards for 
disposal existed, aside from the AEC’s generic radiation protection 
standards, and “there were no systematic site selection criteria or design 
requirements that could be used to establish the best mix of features 
necessary to contain and isolate the wastes.”32 As a result, low-level 
waste was simply dumped into shallow, unlined trenches, and the science 
of disposal was quite primitive. 
B. Youthful Enthusiasm Meets Hard Reality 
 The primitive disposal sites built during the AEC era, 
unsurprisingly, ran into severe trouble as the science of disposal 
advanced. It was soon discovered that the poorly-designed protective 
trenches at Maxey Flats, West Valley, and Sheffield were all leaking 
radionuclides.33 Between 1975 and 1978, all three were shuttered 
permanently.  In 1979, things got worse. In that disastrous year, both 
Beatty and Richland were temporarily closed after Governor Robert List 
of Nevada and Governor Dixie Ray of Washington, respectively, 
discovered that leaky waste containers were arriving at the sites.34 These 
accidents left Barnwell as the sole operating low-level waste disposal site 
available for the entirety of the nation’s waste. 
 South Carolina’s governor, Richard Riley, feared that Barnwell 
would become the permanent host for the nation’s low-level waste; even 
before leakage was discovered at Beatty and Richland, Barnwell was 
receiving over three-quarters of the nation’s low-level waste.35 As such, 
Riley announced in 1979 that Barnwell would cut its waste acceptance 
                                                 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 9. 
33. Id. at 11. In the cases of Maxey Flats and Sheffield, radionuclides contaminated the water 
table. Maxey Flats would later become a Superfund site; as of this writing, remediation is largely 
complete. West Valley was formally closed in the 1970s. Remediation at West Valley has been 
ongoing for the last forty years as part of the larger rehabilitation of the West Valley Reprocessing 
Plant complex. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RECORD OF SELECTION, REMEDIAL ALTERNATIVE 
SELECTION: MAXEY FLATS DISPOSAL SITE, FLEMING COUNTY, KENTUCKY 11 (1991); AUDREY 
THEIR, WEST VALLEY: HISTORY AND FUTURE 1 (2008). 
34. Wayne E. Kiefer, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Issues in Michigan: 1980-2000, 33 MICH. 
ACADEMICIAN 343, 351 (2002). 
35. Gary W. Hart & Keith R. Glaser, A Failure to Enact: A Review of Radioactive Waste Issues 
and Legislation Considered by the Ninety-Sixth Congress, 32 S.C. L. REV. 639, 774 (1981). 
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by 50 percent.36 The states hosting low-level waste disposal facilities 
were close to open revolt. As the General Accounting Office would later 
put it, “the Governors of the three States made it clear that they would no 
longer bear the entire burden of low-level waste disposal—their States 
would not become the Nation’s dumping grounds.”37 
C. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
 The lack of disposal standards and poorly designed containment 
techniques had not gone unnoticed by the Carter Administration. In 
1978, the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management 
(IRG) was assembled to create a comprehensive national strategy for 
dealing with nuclear waste of all kinds.38 It must be remembered, of 
course, that precious few standards existed at the time for the disposal of 
low-level waste beyond the generic radiation protection standards.39 
 The IRG report,40 which came out in March 1979, recommended 
that the Energy Department develop a centralized national plan for 
management of low-level nuclear waste, including the development of 
new low-level waste disposal facilities. The Energy Department would 
handle the planning functions for the national low-level waste disposal 
strategy, while NRC (as well as any Agreement States) would deal with 
day-to-day operations, licensing, and standards development; even the 
Energy Department’s own facilities would be subject to NRC licensing 
and regulation.41  
 Notably, the IRG report assumed that the Energy Department would 
run the development process for new low-level waste disposal sites from 
Washington D.C., with the concurrence and consent of local and state 
authorities.42 Existing low-level waste disposal facilities would be 
transferred to federal ownership and then be leased back to the disposal 
site operators.43 State authorities, already angry with the federal 
                                                 
36. Id. at 775-77. 
37. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 7. 
38. STEWART & STEWART, supra note 11, at 147. The scope of this paper is limited to the 
aspects of the IRG report relating to low level waste. 
39. Complete NRC standards for the packaging, transportation, and ultimate storage of low-
level waste would not be issued until 1983, twenty-plus years after disposal operations had already 
begun at Maxey Flats and Beatty. L. David Condon, The Never-Ending Story: Low-Level Waste and 
the Exclusionary Authority of Noncompacting States, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 65, 67 n.10 (1990). 
40. INTERAGENCY REVIEW GRP. ON NUCLEAR WASTE MGMT., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 106 
(1979) [hereinafter IRG REPORT]. 
41. Id. at H-7–H-8. 
42. Id. at 108-09. 
43. Id. at 124. This “leaseback” setup is the current arrangement at Richland. 
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government’s perceived inability to regulate low-level waste, were not 
thrilled with IRG’s plan.44 
 The National Governors Association drew up a counterproposal in 
1980 in opposition to the IRG’s recommendations.45 The National 
Governors Association plan treated low-level waste as a regional issue 
rather than a national issue, and created an alternative proposal, 
devolving the responsibility to the states to provide for disposal of low-
level waste.46 Under this proposal, states could come together in 
voluntary associations, known as “compacts,” to share waste disposal 
facilities and exclude waste from states outside their compact after 
January 1, 1986.47 Six super-regional compacts were proposed, 
integrating the three then-existing facilities (Beatty, Richland and 
Barnwell) into the proposed Southwest, Northwest, and Southeast 
compacts, respectively. The federal government would only be 
responsible for approving compacts, and for dealing with low-level waste 
associated with the Department of Energy, Navy vessel 
decommissioning, the nuclear weapons program, and waste greater than 
Class C. All proposed low-level radioactive waste compacts, however, 
would have to be explicitly approved by Act of Congress—a requirement 
that would later prove fatal to the entire compact project. Facilities would 
have to be sited following NRC guidelines—disposal standards, 
geological safety requirements, and monitoring requirements—but all 
other decisions were left to the states. As a result of the 1980 lame-duck 
legislative session, Congress decided to adopt the National Governors 
Association’s approach rather than the centralized form recommended by 
the IRG.48 
D. Five Years of Gridlock 
 In its initial form, the LLRWPA led to more gridlock. As early as 
1983, it was clear it was impossible for the compacts to meet the 
congressional deadline for new low-level waste disposal facilities.49 The 
new system was sorely tried during these years—simply put, the states 
were very bad at organizing themselves into compacts. Washington, 
Nevada, and South Carolina quickly joined with neighboring states, but 
                                                 
44. State governors, as represented by the National Governors Association, demanded veto 
power over site selection. Id. at H-14; see also MARY R. ENGLISH, SITING LOW-LEVEL 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITIES: THE PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMA 7 (1992). 
45. TASK FORCE ON LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 27, at 1. 
46. Id. at 10-11. 
47. Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(2)(B) (2013). 
48. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150 (1992); see also TASK FORCE ON LOW-
LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 27, at  6; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b. 
49. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 15, at 15. 
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attempts to secure congressional approval for these three states’ 
respective compacts were blocked by the states without low-level waste 
disposal sites of their own.50 By 1985, no compact had yet gained 
Congressional approval, as states without active disposal sites were loath 
to permit the three existing compact sites to close to outside waste.51 Nor 
had any state or compact built a disposal facility. With the January 1, 
1986, deadline looming, and no resolution in sight, Washington, Nevada, 
and South Carolina started threatening to close their facilities to low-
level waste entirely.52 With twelve days to go before the cutoff, Congress 
hammered out a compromise sponsored by the National Governors 
Association known as the “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985.”53 These amendments will be referred to as 
the 1985 Amendments.54 
E. Seven Years of Chaos 
 The 1985 Amendments added teeth to the LLRWPA, establishing a 
two-part system of positive and negative incentives to encourage the 
states to join compacts and build new disposal facilities.  
 First, the federal government would give financial incentives or 
penalties as a result of compliance or non-compliance. If a state or 
compact managed to meet its deadlines and establish a disposal facility 
on time, the federal government would give financial bonuses to that 
state or compact.55 If a state or compact failed to meet the various 
deadlines, various forms of financial penalties would be incurred.56 The 
most important of these was the prospect of further facility closures. Per 
the statute, Barnwell, Beatty and Richland could close themselves to 
outside waste after January 1, 1993. 
 Second, and more troublesome, if a state did not comply with its 
obligations to have a disposal facility to utilize by January 1, 1993, that 
state would have to take title to all low-level waste generated within the 
state, or else pay for the owners or generators’ storage costs.57 After 
January 1, 1996, the state would have to take title to the waste, 
                                                 
50. Condon, supra note 39, at 69, 71. 
51. Chuang, supra note 10, at 2435. 
52. Condon, supra note 39, at 71. 
53. Chuang, supra note 10, at 2435. 
54. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 
§ 5(a)-(b), 99 Stat. 1842, 1846-47 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021e). 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(A). 
56. Id. § 2021e(d)(1) (adding a surcharge to low-level waste originating in compacts or states 
without disposal arrangements). 
57. Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(A). 
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regardless.58 It was this last provision, the “take-title” provision, which 
provided the most powerful incentive for the states and compacts without 
disposal facilities because of the potentially unlimited liability.59  
 In the end, even these incentives and penalties proved insufficient in 
the face of determined local and state opposition, as one thing or another 
always seemed to derail the proposed waste facilities. Between the 1985 
Amendments and the 1993 deadline, there was only one facility that 
opened during this period, the Class A-only site located in Clive, Utah, 
which was constructed outside the compact process.60  
 Other than the opening of Clive, every other proposed facility met 
with disaster in one way or another. In California, the proposed Ward 
Valley facility missed the 1993 deadline because of an Endangered 
Species Act suit filed on behalf of the endangered desert tortoise.61 After 
a decade of litigation, California and the Southwestern Compact 
abandoned its attempts to build the facility in 2002.62 Michigan’s state 
legislature agreed to build a low-level waste disposal facility for the 
Midwest Compact, then proceeded to pass an authorization bill purposely 
designed to stall site selection indefinitely. As a result, the Midwest 
Compact kicked Michigan out for bad faith.63 
 Perhaps the most amusing failure was that of Nebraska, where the 
State of Nebraska and the Central Compact attempted to build a facility 
in remote Boyd County, in the town of Butte, population 366.64 Butte 
was just another small, dying Midwestern village in a county full of 
small, dying Midwestern villages, and in Boyd County, the competition 
for jobs between those villages was positively Darwinian. Here, Butte 
volunteered itself for consideration as a potential disposal site for the 
Nebraska and the Central Compact, buoyed by the promise of $3 million 
per year in community development funding that the low-level waste 
disposal site brought with it.65 This amounts to the non-paltry figure of 
                                                 
58. Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(C). 
59. Under common-law tort, low-level radioactive waste is an uncommonly dangerous 
substance, so the states would assume liability for any damages caused by the waste. 
60. See Chuang, supra note 10, at 2454. The compact system requires siting decisions to be 
made by compact state representatives in addition to government financing. The Clive site was 
privately financed, and the siting decision made by the investors in conjunction with the state of 
Utah. 
61. U.S. Ecology v. Dep’t of the Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Desert 
Tortoise v. Lujan, No. 93-0114 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 8, 1993) (order granting temporary restraining order)). 
62. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 513 § 4 (A.B. 2214) (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 115261)). 
63. See Kiefer, supra note 34, at 358; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.26201-333.26226 (2013). 
64. SUSAN CRAGIN, NUCLEAR NEBRASKA: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE LITTLE COUNTY 
THAT COULDN’T BE BOUGHT 38 (2007). 
65. Id. 
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$8,000 per year, give or take a few dollars, worth of infrastructure 
funding for every man, woman, and child in the village of Butte. 
 The other Boyd County villages were not particularly happy with 
this state of affairs—partially because of “Not In My Back Yard” 
syndrome, but mostly because of jealousy—and successfully marshaled 
Democratic Party officials against the disposal site.66 Due to this growing 
discontent, Republican Governor Kay Orr, who supported the Butte 
facility, faced a difficult re-election battle against her Democratic 
challenger, Ben Nelson. Nelson used Orr’s support for the proposed 
Butte facility against her to great effect, and narrowly defeated Orr in the 
1990 gubernatorial election.67 As governor, Nelson used impermissible 
political grounds to prevent the facility from being licensed, leading to a 
successful lawsuit by the Central Compact against Nebraska and a 
damage award of $151 million.68  
 Of course, not all states made efforts to develop disposal sites or 
join compacts. Some, such as New York, turned to the one 
quintessentially American pastime: litigation. 
F. Twenty Years of Uncertainty 
 New York never joined a compact, preferring to build a low-level 
waste disposal facility first and find compact partners second. Five sites 
were identified by state regulators: two in Cortland County, located thirty 
miles south of Syracuse, and three in Allegany County, seventy-five 
miles southwest of Buffalo as the crow flies.69 While site selection was 
ongoing, the two potential host counties and the state attorney general’s 
office filed suit in 1990, seeking to have the penalties created by the 
1985 Amendments—both financial and take-title—declared 
unconstitutional under the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, as well as the 
Fifth, Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.70 In the space of two years, the 
New York suit lost motions to dismiss on all counts at both the district 
court level,71 and on appeal to the Second Circuit.72 New York appealed 
its Guarantee Clause and Tenth Amendment claims to the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
                                                 
66. STEWART & STEWART, supra note 11, at 153-54. 
67. CRAGIN, supra note 64, at 131. 
68. Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, 226 F.Supp.2d 1047, 1102–04, 1140–42 (D. Neb. 
2002), aff’d, 358 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2004). Boyd County, Nebraska, continues to decline; since the 
1990 census, its population has dropped by over 25 percent. 
69. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992). 
70. Id. at 152-54. 
71. New York v. United States, 757 F.Supp.2d 10 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). 
72. New York v. United States, 942 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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 In a landmark 1992 decision, the Supreme Court held that the take-
title provisions of the 1985 Amendments violated the Tenth Amendment 
by improperly coercing the states to do the bidding of Congress, but the 
Court let the financial incentives stand.73 The Court’s majority seemed 
strangely unwilling to accept the fact that the LLRWPA and the 1985 
Amendments were passed at the behest of state authorities rather than in 
defiance of them—a fact that the legislative history makes clear74 and 
Justice White’s dissent points out.75 
 The Court’s decision put the final nail in the coffin of the 
LLRWPA, by removing the most powerful incentive for state 
compliance—the threat of unlimited liability from low-level radioactive 
waste. As might be expected, support for new disposal facilities petered 
out after the New York decision, leaving Utah and South Carolina as the 
only active low-level waste disposal sites outside the Northwest 
Compact—Richland was closed to out-of-compact waste at the 1993 
cutoff, and Beatty shut down entirely at the Nevada governor’s executive 
order in 1992.76  
 Thus, for twenty years, most of the country’s ability to dispose of 
Class B and C low-level waste was dependent on the whims of South 
Carolina and Utah regulators. Disposal fees at Barnwell, the sole site 
open for Class B and C waste, went up by 650 percent between 1992 and 
2003.77 (As noted previously, Clive only accepted Class A waste, per the 
terms of its license, but can accept waste from any source, as it exists 
outside the compact system.) South Carolina regulators actually closed 
Barnwell to out-of-compact waste between 1994 and 1995,78 when South 
Carolina was part of the Southeast Compact, and again after 2008, when 
capacity issues led the state to close Barnwell to waste originating 
outside of the Atlantic Compact.79 During Barnwell’s periods of closure 
to outside waste, waste generators without access to a disposal site had to 
store their Class B and C waste on-site, an expensive and difficult 
undertaking. One university was forced to spend $12 million for a low-
level waste disposal facility of its own.80 
 This constant insecurity, especially with regard to Class B and C 
waste, was not all bad: as disposal costs increased, waste volume 
                                                 
73. New York, 505 U.S. at 176. 
74. See supra Parts II-C, II-E. 
75. New York, 505 U.S. at 195-197 (White, J., dissenting). 
76. STEWART & STEWART, supra note 11, at 154. 
77. Id. 
78. S.C. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & ENVTL. CONTROL, supra note 5, at 1. 
79. STEWART & STEWART, supra note 11, at 154. 
80. Id. at 158; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE: 
STATUS OF DISPOSAL AVAILABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES 5 (2008). 
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reduction techniques flourished, as generators developed innovative 
ways to reduce waste volumes through shredding, incineration, and 
compaction, among other things.81 Waste generators also took steps to 
reduce the amount of equipment exposed to harmful radioactivity. 
 The twenty-year run of failure since the New York decision, 
combined with the intermittent availability of Barnwell for Class B and 
C waste, led to opportunities for states willing to cynically exploit the 
compact system: of the ten currently existing compacts, five are 
noncontiguous; of these, three (the Atlantic, Southwestern, and Texas 
compacts) are the products of gerrymandering. 
 The Atlantic Compact originally included only New Jersey and 
Connecticut, but this changed when South Carolina legislators sought to 
close Barnwell to out-of-state waste in 2000. South Carolina went 
compact shopping, eventually deciding on the Atlantic Compact so as to 
gain control over waste inputs at Barnwell. Between 1995 and 2000, 
South Carolina was unaffiliated with any compact, and accepted waste 
from any state except North Carolina.82 
 Similarly, the Southwestern Compact counts California, Arizona, 
and the Dakotas as members. At the time of the compact’s creation, 
California, a major waste producer, was making serious efforts to build a 
facility in the Mojave Desert to avert the negative incentives of the 1985 
Amendments. California agreed to include North and South Dakota in 
the Southwestern Compact, in exchange for construction funds.83 
 The Texas Compact provides the third illustration of this 
phenomenon, and demonstrates how the LLRWPA system can be 
exploited to its fullest. Ironically, this cynical approach to low-level 
waste disposal led to the construction of the only new regional disposal 
facility to be developed under the compact system. In 2003, Texas 
identified a site in isolated Andrews County, near the New Mexico 
border, and began the long process of licensing and construction for the 
new Andrews facility.84 With the political will and local support to build 
a new low-level waste disposal site in place, Texas began to seek out a 
compact “partner.” Texas placed onerous conditions on membership in 
the Texas Compact: Texas appointees would hold a supermajority over 
                                                 
81. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N ADVISORY COMM. ON NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 7, 
at 2; STEWART & STEWART, supra note 11, at 158. 
82. After North Carolina was unable to build a facility for the Southeast Compact, South 
Carolina withdrew from the compact in protest, and excluded North Carolina waste from Barnwell, 
even though South Carolina was not a member of any compact at the time. This was, of course, in 
blatant defiance of the LLRWPA. S.C. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & ENVTL. CONTROL, supra note 5, at 3. 
83. STEWART & STEWART, supra note 11, at 151. 
84. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N ADVISORY COMM. ON NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 7, 
at 26. 
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the compact commission and the other state would have to put down $25 
million in construction costs for the Andrews facility. States with large 
populations and states that generated large amounts of waste were 
excluded from possible membership.85 In short, every possible step was 
taken to ensure that Texas retained complete control over its compact—
Texas wanted to have its cake and eat it too. 
 Texas also did an excellent job deciding on a host community: 
Andrews is located in the Permian Basin, an area home to a wide variety 
of nuclear facilities, including the Waste Isolation Pilot Project. Most of 
the heavy local opposition of the type encountered in Nebraska and New 
York was thus avoided. 
 The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality issued a license 
for Andrews to operate in 2009, clearing the way for construction to 
commence, and the facility opened in 2012.86 Andrews currently accepts 
Class A, B, and C low-level waste from all sources, per a determination 
by the Texas Compact Commission; however, this is subject to change at 
any time, due to Texas’ control of the Compact Commission.87 
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LOW-LEVEL WASTE COMPACT SYSTEM 
 As it stands now, there are four low-level radioactive waste disposal 
facilities presently operating in the United States. Richland and Barnwell 
accept all classes of commercial low-level waste and act as the regional 
disposal facilities for the Northwest and Atlantic compacts, respectively. 
Both date back to the AEC era, and neither accepts out-of-compact 
waste. Clive accepts Class A waste from all sources, and currently exists 
outside the compact system.. Litigation is ongoing as the Northwest 
Compact attempts to exert jurisdiction over Clive.88 Clive was 
constructed as a private venture; as of 2005, Clive handled 99 percent of 
all Class A radioactive waste generated in the United States.89 Finally, 
Andrews, the newest of the four facilities, accepts all classes of waste 
from all sources, and serves as the regional disposal facility for the Texas 
Compact. 
                                                 
85. STEWART & STEWART, supra note 11, at 151. 
86. TEXAS COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL LICENSE NO. R04100 
(2009). 
87. See Jim Vertuno, Texas Officials Approve Radioactive Waste Dump, BOSTON.COM (March 
23, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/local/vermont/articles/2012/03/23/texas_officials_approve_
radioactive_waste_dump/. 
88. EnergySolutions, LLC v. Utah, 625 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2010). 
89. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT: 
APPROACHES USED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES MAY PROVIDE USEFUL LESSONS FOR MANAGING U.S. 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE 70 (2007). It must be noted, of course, that these figures predate two critical 
occurrences: first, the closure of Barnwell to non-compact waste, and second, the 10th Circuit 
decision confirming the Northwest Compact’s jurisdiction over Clive. 
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 After Andrews’ opening, physical capacity is no longer an issue for 
the short term. Richland and Barnwell have sufficient capacity to handle 
all their respective compacts’ waste needs until, at least, 2050.90 The 
outlook for the other thirty-six states is no longer as dire as it was even 
one year ago because both Clive and Andrews are currently open to 
receive waste. Given projected waste volumes, Clive has adequate 
capacity under its license to handle nearly the entirety of the nation’s 
Class A waste until 2040, even without expansion.91 Andrews, of course, 
is brand-new, and is licensed to operate through 2024, with adequate 
capacity to import large quantities of waste.92 Andrews should be able to 
handle up to 1 million cubic feet of imported low-level waste through 
2024.93 
 The largest threat to the continued availability of low-level waste 
disposal facilities is now political rather than physical. Under the current 
compact arrangements, Texas and Utah have near-complete power over 
the nation’s low-level waste disposal system, and will continue to do so 
unless major regulatory changes occur in the system for regulating low-
level waste disposal sites. If the Utah or Texas state governments, or 
their associated compacts, start having second thoughts about importing 
waste, like what has happened already with South Carolina, Washington, 
and Nevada, the entire national system for low-level waste disposal 
could be upended once again. Even now, the Northwest Compact is 
attempting to veto the importation of certain waste into the Clive facility, 
which can import waste from anywhere. In 2010, the 10th Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled in favor of the Northwest Compact’s regulatory 
jurisdiction, even though the Clive facility is not actually a regional 
disposal facility as defined by the LLRWPA.94 This does not bode well 
for the future, given how rapidly the Northwest Compact closed 
Richland to outside waste in the 1990s. 
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
 The states’ commercial low-level waste disposal needs are met for 
now. But the present should not, and cannot, be the basis of a viable 
long-term solution. Simply put, the LLRWPA is fragile and vulnerable to 
disruption—in short, it is a house built on sand.95 The last thirty-plus 
                                                 
90. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 80, at 5. 
91. Id. 
92. TEXAS LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL COMPACT COMM’N, WCS COMPACT 
WASTE FACILITY DISPOSAL CAPACITY REPORT 5 (2012). 
93. Id. at 12. 
94. EnergySolutions, LLC v Utah, 625 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2010). 
95. “And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened 
unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand: And the rain descended, and the floods 
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years have been a fiasco for low-level waste disposal because the states 
are just so bad at managing low-level waste on their own. As has been 
shown, the compact system encourages bad behavior by the states. The 
examples referenced, like the gerrymandering of the Texas Compact, the 
petty battles between North and South Carolina over who would bear 
responsibility for Southeast Compact waste, and Nebraska Governor 
Nelson’s favor to the NIMBYs of Boyd County, Nebraska, are just the 
tip of the iceberg. The whole affair would be comical, were a subject of 
national concern not at stake. The reasons for reform are legion. 
 Fundamentally, the LLRWPA misidentified what the actual 
problem was. In creating the compact system, Congress believed that the 
problem with low-level waste regulation was that the federal government 
was just not very good at it and that state regulators, given the chance, 
would be able to handle the problem better. Congress simply 
misidentified the problem. The problems that had beset low-level waste 
disposal sites up to that time were technological, not the results of flaws 
in the regulatory structure itself. One must not forget that no scientific 
standards existed for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste between 
1962, when Beatty opened, and 1983, when NRC finalized rules for low-
level waste disposal. At present, of course, the science of disposal is 
much better understood, but changes in the regulatory structure have 
made it impossible to handle commercial low-level waste in a sane 
manner. 
A. A Modest Proposal: Energy Department Integration 
 In the midst of the chaos surrounding the commercial low-level 
waste disposal system, the Energy Department’s parallel system for 
handling low-level waste has plodded along quietly and competently, 
with none of the drama, backstabbing, and hyperbole associated with the 
commercial low-level waste disposal system.96 It would be possible, as 
well as legal, for the Energy Department to accept commercial waste into 
its own disposal system once again, as the AEC once did between 1959 
and 1963.97 As of 2004, the Energy Department had ample capacity in its 
own low-level waste disposal sites in Nevada and Washington, and could 
                                                                                                             
came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of it.” 
Matthew 7:26-27 (King James ). 
96. As noted the Department of Energy is responsible for Department of Energy waste, waste 
from Navy vessel decommissioning, and waste from the national nuclear weapons program, as well 
as waste greater than Class C. 
97. Kiefer, supra note 34, at 346. 
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accept compact waste on a contract basis.98 (Class B and C waste, 
obviously, would be preferable, because multiple alternate options are 
available for Class A waste at the moment.) 
 This option would keep the states honest: with Energy Department 
facilities available as a backstop, threats to close a compact facility, as 
what happened at Barnwell, Richland, and Beatty, would have far less 
potency. There are, of course, risks involved in opening Energy 
Department facilities on an ad-hoc basis. The most obvious one is that 
states might begin to rely on the Energy Department for day-to-day 
disposal, for instance, rather than using Energy Department facilities as 
waste disposers of last resort, but this problem is easily cured by 
charging high access fees. 
B. A Slightly Less Modest Proposal: Refederalization 
 The other alternative, of course, is to scrap the entire compact 
system and return to the pre-1980 model, where NRC managed 
commercial low-level waste at a national level, subject to devolution to 
Agreement States where appropriate. This would solve the disposal crisis 
permanently, and eliminate the danger of state recalcitrance (as exhibited 
by South Carolina towards North Carolina) by treating low-level 
radioactive waste at the national level again, just as it was in 1980, 
permitting the full force of federal power to deal with the NIMBY 
problem.  
 Of course, this plan would require Congressional approval—and 
has a snowball’s chance in hell of passing Congress.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 In 1980, the federal government was doing a sub-par job of 
regulating low-level radioactive waste, and the states wanted that bad 
management to come to an end. The problem, the states identified was 
the choice of regulator, rather than a lack of technical knowledge on the 
subject of low-level radioactive waste disposal. The states successfully 
lobbied Congress to devolve regulatory authority, thinking that they 
would be able to competently manage low-level radioactive waste at the 
regional, rather than the national level. Simply put, the states were 
wrong. 
 The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, the states’ hand-
crafted plan, was a disaster from the beginning. For over thirty years, the 
                                                 
98. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE: DISPOSAL 
AVAILABILITY ADEQUATE IN THE SHORT TERM, BUT OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO IDENTIFY ANY 
FUTURE SHORTFALLS 42 (2004). 
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compact system has produced drama worthy of a high school soap opera, 
as the states plotted, schemed, and squabbled, over ways to make some 
other jurisdiction handle their radioactive waste. Without the federal 
government there to check the states’ worst desires, and with the 
Supreme Court declaring the only useful incentive from the 1985 
Amendments unconstitutional, the only things left over were drama, 
gridlock, and uncertainty. 
 For these reasons, it is time for the federal government to reassert its 
role in low-level radioactive waste disposal: first, by permitting the 
Energy Department to provide a backstop if state disposal sites become 
unavailable; and second, by repealing the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Act. 
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APPENDIX A: CURRENT & PAST LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL SITES 
Site Date operational Date closed Status Waste classes Compact Accepts out-of-
compact waste? 




Maxey Flats, KY 1963 1977 Closed n/a99 n/a - 
West Valley, NY 1963 1975 Closed n/a100 n/a - 
Richland, WA 1965 - Open ABC Northwest No 
Barnwell, SC 1969 - Open ABC Atlantic No 
Sheffield, IL 1968 1978 Closed n/a101 - - 
Clive, UT 1991 - Open A TBD102 Yes 
Andrews, TX 2012 - Open ABC Texas Yes 
  
                                                 
99. Waste classes were not created until 1983. 
100. Waste classes were not created until 1983. 
101. Waste classes were not created until 1983. 
102. Clive exists outside the compact system, but litigation between Clive’s operator, the Northwest Compact, and Utah is ongoing. 
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APPENDIX B1: 1980 NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION PROPOSED LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMPACTS103 
Compact States Regional disposal 
facility 
Midwest Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin - 
Northeast 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont 
- 
Northwest Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, Wyoming Richland, WA 
South Central Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, Texas - 
Southeast 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee 
Barnwell, SC 
Southwest Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah Beatty, NV 
Multiple possibilities 
Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington 
DC, West Virginia 
 
                                                 
103. TASK FORCE ON LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 27, at 10-11. 
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APPENDIX B2:CURRENT LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMPACTS (2013) 104 
Compact States Regional disposal 
facility 
Appalachian Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia - 
Atlantic Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina Barnwell, SC 
Central Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Kansas - 
Central Midwest Illinois, Kentucky - 
Midwest Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin - 
Northwest 




Rocky Mountain Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico Richland, WA106 
Southeast Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia - 
                                                 
104. Taken from NRC’s website. Low-Level Waste Compacts, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/llw-disposal/licensing/compacts.html (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2013). 
105. Regulated under Utah state law rather than by the Northwest Compact. Accepts Class A waste from all fifty states. 
106. Sends waste to Richland under a contract with the Northwest Compact. 
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Southwestern Arizona, California,107 North Dakota, South Dakota - 
Texas Texas, Vermont Andrews, TX108 
Unaffiliated/ no 
compact 
Maine, Michigan,109 Nebraska,110 New Hampshire, New 




                                                 
107. Ward Valley LLW site is fully permitted, but facility was cancelled in 2002. 
108. Accepts waste from all fifty states, pursuant to a determination of the Texas Legislature. 
109. Ejected from Midwest Compact after failing to build disposal site. 
110. Ejected from Central Compact after failing to build disposal site. 
111. Withdrew from Southeast Compact after being selected to host disposal site. 
